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Casenote

"Sexting" to Minors in a Rapidly Evolving
Digital Age: Frix v. State Establishes the
Applicability of Georgia's Obscenity Statutes
to Text Messages

The capabilities of modern cell phones are advancing at an unprecedented rate, and with these advancements, cell phones now resemble
personal computers in numerous ways. Messages, pictures, and videos,
which were once transmittable only by computer, can now be sent from
one cell phone to another or from a computer to a cell phone and vice
versa. While the differences between these two electronic devices may
seem increasingly trivial to the average electronics user, these differences are pivotal for the criminal defendant who has used a cell phone to
send a sexually explicit text message to a minor. The disparity lies in
the scope of Georgia's obscenity statutes and in the extent to which
certain statutes have been expanded to apply to cell phones. In Frix v.
State,1 the Georgia Court of Appeals applied three obscenity statutes to
text messages sent to a minor from a cell phone.2 The appellate court
dismissed two of the three obscenity charges against the defendant based

1. 298 Ga. App. 538, 680 S.E.2d 582 (2009).
2. Id. at 538-39, 680 S.E.2d at 584.
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on the court's classification of cell phones and cell phone content.3

Thus, Frix laid the foundation for the role cell phones will play in
Georgia's obscenity statutes-a role that will likely evolve along with the
capabilities of modem cell phones.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 5, 2005, Joseph Britton Frix (Frix) used his cell phone to
send multiple sexually explicit text messages to a fourteen-year-old girl
whom he knew was a minor.4 The text messages contained descriptions
of sexual acts Frix wished to perform on the young girl.5 The police
were notified, and during their investigation, Frix confessed to sending
the messages.'
Frix was charged and indicted by a grand jury for the following
criminal offenses: electronically furnishing obscene materials to a minor
in violation of section 16-12-100.1 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.)7 (Count 1); distributing harmful materials to a
minor in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103' (Count 2); and engaging in
obscene telephone contact with a minor in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-12100.39 (Count 3). 10

Following the grand jury proceeding, Frix filed a general demurrer
and moved to quash the indictment. In response, the State filed an
accusation with Frix's consent, charging Frix with the same offenses but
describing the alleged unlawful conduct related to Counts 1 through 3
with greater specificity. When the trial court denied Frix's motion to
quash, he applied for and was granted an interlocutory appeal. On
appeal, Frix argued that the statutes allegedly violated under Counts 1
through 3 did not prohibit his conduct and, therefore, did not provide
fair notice that such conduct was illegal." The Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part-reversing the trial court's
denial of Frix's motion to quash as to Count 1 (electronically furnishing

3. Id. at 539, 680 S.E.2d at 584.
4. Brief of Appellee at 2, 3, Frix v. State, 298 Ga. App. 538, 680 S.E.2d 582 (2009) (No.
A09A0172).
5. Accusation No. 2008CR1373-4 at 2 of 3, Frix, 298 Ga. App. 538, 680 S.E.2d 582 (No.
A09A0172).
6. Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 2.
7. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1 (2007).
8. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103 (2007).
9. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.3 (2007).
10. Frix v. State, 298 Ga. App. 538, 538, 680 S.E.2d 582, 584. Frix was also charged
with a fourth count of possession of methamphetamine. Id. Because this charge was not
disputed in the court of appeals, it has been omitted from this Article's analysis.
11. Id. at 538-39, 680 S.E.2d at 584.
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obscene material to a minor) and Count 3 (obscene phone contact with
a minor), and affirming the denial of Frix's motion
to quash as to Count
12
2 (distributing harmful material to a minor).

II.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Electronically FurnishingObscene Material to Minors (Count 1)

O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.113 was enacted in 1993,'4 and the original
statute has remained in effect without subsequent amendments. 5 The
statute criminalizes the act of electronically furnishing obscene materials
to minors 6 and defines "[e]lectronically furnishes" as "[making]
available by electronic storage device, including floppy disks and other
magnetic storage devices, or by CD-ROM; or... [making] available by
allowing access to information stored in a computer, including making
material available by operating a computer bulletin board."" Material
falling within the scope of the statute includes any sexually explicit
"picture, photograph, drawing, or similar visual representation," as well
as "[a]ny written or aural matter" describing sexually explicit conduct,
when such material "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."" Violation of this code section results in "a misdemeanor of a
high and aggravated nature,"" punishable by a fine of up to $5000 or
incarceration up to twelve months, or both.2" Furthermore, the conduct
proscribed by this statute is considered a "[diangerous sexual offense"
under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(A)(xvi), 21 and a person convicted of
such offense must register as a sexual offender.22 The statute's
primary purpose is to penalize individuals who electronically furnish
obscene material to minors.23
This statute originated when Representative Vinson Wall introduced
House Bill 138 (HB 138) to the Georgia General Assembly.24 The

12. Id. at 539, 680 S.E.2d at 584.
13. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1 (2007).
14. 1993 Ga. Laws 735, 738.
15. See O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1.
16. Id. § 16-12-100.1(b).
17. Id. § 16-12-100.1(a)(3).
18. Id. § 16-12-100.1(b).
19. Id. § 16-12-100.1(c).
20. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-4(a) (2008).
21. O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(A)(xvi) (Supp. 2009).
22. Id. § 42-1-12(e)(2) (Supp. 2009).
23. Glenn D. Baker, Offenses Against Minors: Prohibit the Electronic Furnishingof
Obscene Material to Minors, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 104, 105 (1993).
24. See Ga. H.R. Bill 138, Reg. Sess. (1993).
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introduction of HB 138 followed a nationwide sting operation called
Operation Longarm, in which three hundred federal, state, and local law
enforcement officers raided forty locations seizing "a large amount of
data stored on computer equipment which contained child pornography"
in the "first ever crackdown on computerized pornography."' Wall's
sponsorship of the bill began after a large computer pornography ring
was discovered in the Atlanta metropolitan area. The situation was
brought to Wall's attention when he was shown by some constituents
how easily pornography could be accessed from a home computer.
Further research revealed that this computerized pornography was free
to the public and, for the most part, did not verify the age of the persons
accessing the material. In addition, a distribution network was
uncovered that converted pornography into floppy disks and sold them
on school campuses.26 HB 138 was introduced to criminalize the
selling, loaning, furnishing, or disseminating of harmful sexual material
to minors through a computer or computer network.2"
When first introduced in the House of Representatives, the bill did not
contain the current subsection (a), which defines eight terms used within
the statute, including the term electronically furnishes.8 However,
when presented to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Special
Judiciary drafted an alternative version of the bill, which included the
eight definitions to reduce ambiguity and to clarify the scope of the
statute. This new version was then passed by both the House and the
Senate.29
This statute represents the General Assembly's first attempt to combat
the issue of computer pornography.3 ° Rather than placing sole responsibility on parents to monitor and prevent their children from accessing
obscene material, the statute places responsibility on the source of the
pornography.3' Wall described HB 138 as "an attempt to bring our
pornography laws into the modern century.""
Since the enactment of the statute, convictions have been sustained for
conduct involving more than just computer pornography, ostensibly

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Baker, supra note 23, at 104-05.
Id. at 105.
Ga. H.R. Bill 138, Reg. Sess. (1993).
Baker, supra note 23, at 106-07.
Id. at 107.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 107-08 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ben Smith III, Computer
Porn, Foster ParentBills OK'd in House, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 4, 1993, at D3).
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expanding the scope of the statute to include e-mail and text messages. 3 3 In Ward v. State,34 a man was convicted for electronically
furnishing obscene material to a minor in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-12100.1 after he sent pornographic material to a fifteen-year-old girl via email. 35 In State v. Lee,36 a man was convicted under O.C.G.A. § 16-12100.1 after police found four pornographic photographs on the victim's
cell phone that were sent from the defendant's cell phone. 37 Although
the trial court's decision in Lee was subsequently appealed to the
Georgia Court of Appeals, the applicability of O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1 was
not at issue. 8
Prior to the enactment of O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1, Florida was the only
state that criminalized the selling or loaning of pornography to minors
via computer. 39 Florida Statutes section 847.013840 prohibits transmitting-defined as sending via "electronic mail"-harmful material to
minors by electronic device. 4' Similarly, an Alabama statute prohibits
transmitting obscene material to minors via computer, specifically
indicating a "computer communication system" as the prohibited means
of transmission.4 2 Georgia is the only state to make the distinction
between electronic storage device4 3 and electronic device." In contrast
to the definition of electronic storage device stated above, O.C.G.A. § 1612-100.2" specifically defines electronic device to include cell phones.4 6
Unlawful Distribution of Harmful Material to Minors (Count 2)

B.

O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103" was originally enacted in 1983.48 This Act
made it illegal to sell or loan to a minor for monetary consideration:

33. Although Frix established that text messages do not fall within the meaning of
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1, convictions were sustained for obscene material sent to minors in
cell phone text messages prior to the ruling in Frix. See State v. Lee, 295 Ga. App. 49,49,
670 S.E.2d 879, 880 (2008).
34. 299 Ga. App. 826, 683 S.E.2d 894 (2009).
35. Id. at 826, 683 S.E.2d at 895.
36. 295 Ga. App. 49, 670 S.E.2d 879 (2008).
37. Id. at 49, 670 S.E.2d at 880.
38. See id.
39. Baker, supra note 23, at 105.

§ 847.0138

(Supp. 2010).

40.

FLA. STAT. ANN.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-111(a) (LexisNexis 2005).
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1(3)(A).
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.2(b)(2) (2007).
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.2 (2007).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103 (2007).
1983 Ga. Laws 1437, 1441.
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(1) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film,
or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the
human body which depicts sexually explicit nudity, sexual conduct, or
sadomasochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors; or (2) Any book,
pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, or sound
recording which contains any matter enumerated in paragraph (1) of
this subsection, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative
accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct, or sadomasochistic
abuse and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors.49
Enacted under the same Act,5" O.C.G.A. § 16-12-10551 provides that
a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103 is to be treated as a "misdemeanor
of a high and aggravated nature," 2 punishable by a fine of up to $5000,
incarceration up to twelve months, or both.
It is unclear whether a
violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103 requires that the defendant register as
a sex offender because, whereas other obscenity statutes are specifically
identified, O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103 is not listed under the definition of
"dangerous sexual offense" contained in O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(A).'
In February 1984, the General Assembly made a minor amendment
to the statute, 55 and in April 1984, the statute was broadened to apply
not only to selling and loaning material to minors, but to any furnishing
or disseminating of materials to a minor.6 The April amendment also
inserted additional provisions for motion pictures, misrepresentation of
age by minors under the age of eighteen or by their parents or guardians, and public displays.57 In 1996 the statute was amended to
include a provision regarding admission to motion pictures for persons
under the age of twenty-one, and to remove the age of eighteen from the
misrepresentation provisions, so that such provisions would apply to
persons up through the age of twenty-one." Most recently, in 2005 the
statute was amended to include a provision relating to video game rating
systems.5 9

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103(a) (emphasis added).
1983 Ga. Laws at 1441.
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-105 (2007).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-4(a).
See O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(A).
1984 Ga. Laws 22, 43.
1984 Ga. Laws 1495, 1500.
1984 Ga. Laws at 1500-01.
1996 Ga. Laws 273, 275-76.
2005 Ga. Laws 1261, 1261-62.
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C. Obscene Phone Contact with a Child (Count 3)
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.36o was enacted in 2000,61 and the original
version of the statute has not been amended.6 2 This statute prohibits
a person over the age of seventeen from engaging in obscene phone
contact with a minor." Phone contact is obscene when it "involves any
aural matter containing explicit verbal descriptions or narrative accounts
of sexually explicit nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or
sadomasochistic abuse which is intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual
desire of either the child or the person."' A person convicted under
this statute has committed "a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated
nature,"65 punishable by a fine of up to $5000, incarceration up to
twelve months, or both. 6 Similar to the conduct under O.C.G.A. § 1612-100.1, the conduct prohibited under this statute is considered a
"dangerous sexual offense," and a conviction requires registration as a
sexual offender.67
With this legal history serving as a backdrop, Frix v.State' was a
case of first impression for the court of appeals regarding the applicability of these three statutes to material sent to a minor from a cell phone.
Based on the court's construction of the statutes, Frix established that
obscene text messages violate O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103, but not §§ 16-12100.1 or 16-12-100.3.69
III.

COURTS RATIONALE

State,70

the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the defenIn Frix v.
dant's conviction on Count 1, holding that his conduct did not constitute
"[ellectronically furnishing obscene material to [a] minor[]" under
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1,7 ' because text messages are not included in the
meaning of electronically furnished as defined by the statute.72 With
no prior case law interpreting the applicability of O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.3 (2007).
2000 Ga. Laws 1237, 1238.
See O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.3.
Id. § 16-12-100.3(b).
Id.
Id. § 16-12-100.3(c)(1).
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-4(a).
O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(A)(xvi).
298 Ga. App. 538, 680 S.E.2d 582 (2009).
Id. at 539, 680 S.E.2d at 584.
298 Ga. App. 538, 680 S.E.2d 582 (2009).
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1 (2007).
Frix, 298 Ga. App. at 539-40, 680 S.E.2d at 584-85.
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to text messages, the court began its analysis by interpreting the text of
the statute. 3 The court recognized that unambiguous text should be
construed in light of its plain meaning, while ambiguous text should be
construed to accomplish the statute's purpose.7 '4 Additionally, criminal
statutes "must be strictly construed against the State."75
Concluding that subsection (B) of O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1(a)(3),
regarding information stored in a computer, does not encompass text
messages sent via cell phones, the court focused its analysis on whether
transmitting material as a text message constitutes making such
material "available by electronic storage device" under subsection (A) of
the statute. 6 While conceding that modern cell phones have the
capacity to store vast amounts of private electronic information,
including "incoming and outgoing calls, address books, calendars, voice
and text messages, e-mail, video, and pictures,"" the court did not find
this conclusive evidence that cell phones constitute electronic storage
devices."
Rather, the court evaluated the phrase electronic storage
device based on the context of the statute as a whole, focusing on the
language that immediately follows the phrase: "including floppy disks
and other magnetic storage devices, or by CD-ROM."7 9 Although the
term including can be used as a term of expansion or limitation," the
court followed Georgia Supreme Court precedent establishing that when
"a general term [such as 'electronic storage device'] is followed by the
word 'including,' which is itself followed by specific terms, the intent may
be one of limitation."" Thus, the court held that the term including
limits the meaning of electronic storage devices exclusively to floppy
disks and CD-ROMs. 2
Further, the court distinguished floppy disks and CD-ROMs from cell
phones by explaining that floppy disks and CD-ROMs are used to store
material that can be accessed via computer, while cell phones are
communication devices that can store material that can be accessed

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id. at 540, 680 S.E.2d at 585.
Id. (citing State v. Brown, 250 Ga. App. 376, 378-79, 551 S.E.2d 773, 775 (2001)).
Id. (quoting Brown, 250 Ga. App. at 379, 551 S.E.2d at 775)).
Id. at 540-41, 680 S.E.2d at 585.
See id. at 541, 680 S.E.2d at 585.
Id.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1(a)(3XA)).

80.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 763 (6th ed. 1994).

81.
added)
S.E.2d
82.

Frix, 298 Ga. App. at 541, 680 S.E.2d at 586 (alteration in original) (emphasis
(quoting Berryhill v. Ga. Cmty. Support & Solutions, Inc., 281 Ga. 439, 441, 638
278, 280-81 (2006)).
Id. at 541-42, 680 S.E.2d at 586.
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without the use of a computer.3 In other words, the mediums differ
because with floppy disks and CD-ROMs, the recipient of information
must be given the device and then use a computer to access the
information; whereas with text messages sent via cell phones, the
information is readily accessible to the recipient without exchanging the
phone or requiring the use of a computer.'
Therefore, the court
concluded that sending a text message does not constitute making its
content available "by electronic storage device" under O.C.G.A. § 16-12100.1(a)(3)(A). s5
According to the court, if the Georgia General Assembly had intended
the definition of electronic storage device to include all devices capable
of storing electronic information, a number of phraseology techniques
could have been used when it drafted the statute at issue. 8 For
instance, because courts should construe statutory language to avoid
rendering any of the language superfluous, the General Assembly
could have omitted listing specific examples altogether.'
In the
alternative, the General Assembly could have included the phrase but
not limited to to clarify its intent that the word including be used in its
expansive capacity.8 9 In fact, the General Assembly employed this
expansive use of the word include in the subsection immediately
following the one at issue, thus lending support for the court's conclusion
that the limiting use of the word was intended in O.C.G.A. § 16-12100.1(a)(3)(A). 90
Finally, to the extent O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1(a)(3)(A) is deemed
ambiguous, the court relied on the rule of strict construction, under
which the ambiguity is construed in the defendant's favor.91 Therefore,
even if the court concluded that the broad construction of the statute
was reasonable and included cell phones as electronic storage devices,
the equally reasonable construction
excluding cell phones would be
92
favored under the rule of lenity.

83. Id.

84. See id.
85. Id. at 542, 680 S.E.2d at 586.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Berryhill, 281 Ga. at 441, 638 S.E.2d at 281).
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Berryhill, 281 Ga. at 442, 638 S.E.2d at 281).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The rule of lenity provides that, "where two reasonable interpretations of a
penal statute exist-one inculpating and the other exculpating, or one imposing a harsher
or longer punishment and the other imposing a milder or shorter punishment-a court
must adopt the interpretation that favors the defendant." LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID
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As for Count 2, the court upheld Frix's conviction for unlawful
distribution of harmful material to a minor under O.C.G.A. § 16-12103, 93 after concluding that the statute's phrase printed matter however
reproduced applies to text messages. 94 The court classified text
messages as printed matter because they include words or numbers that
are read by the recipient. 95 The court viewed the General Assembly's
use of the phrase however reproduced as evidence that the particular
medium of printed material was irrelevant in terms of satisfying the
statute. 96

Frix argued that the statute should only apply to the production of
tangible materials.97 However, the court interpreted the plain meaning
of the statute, with its use of the broad words furnish and disseminate,
as encompassing delivery by any method, including electronic transmission. 9 After establishing that Frix's conduct fit within the statute, the
court further concluded that the plain language of the statute was
sufficient to give a reasonably intelligent person fair notice that his
contemplated actions were prohibited under the statute. 99
Finally, the court reversed Frix's conviction for Count 3, holding that
Frix's text messages did not constitute obscene phone contact with a
minor.'00 The State conceded in its appellate brief that the defendant's
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.3
conduct did not fit within this statute. 10 1
(b)'0 2 requires that the phone contact be "aural," and because a text
message is not capable of being heard, the court concluded it does not
fall within the meaning of the statute." 3
Therefore, with the court's decision that obscene text messages violate
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103, but not O.C.G.A. §§ 16-12-100.1 or 16-12100.3, '04 Frix represents an important case for interpreting Georgia's
obscenity laws and creates precedent that implicates a number of

CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND
LAWYERING STRATEGIES 477 (2d ed. 2009).
93. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103 (2007).
94. Frix, 298 Ga. App. at 543-44, 680 S.E.2d at 587.
95. Id. at 543, 680 S.E.2d at 587.
96. Id. at 544, 680 S.E.2d at 587.
97. Id. at 543, 680 S.E.2d at 587.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 544, 680 S.E.2d at 587.
100. Id., 680 S.E.2d at 587-88.
101. Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 6.
102. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.3(b) (2007).
103. Frix, 298 Ga. App. at 544-45, 680 S.E.2d at 588.
104. Id. at 545, 680 S.E.2d at 588.
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possibilities for the future of obscenity statutes as they relate to cell
phones.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Previously left to the discretion of the prosecutor, the rulings issued
by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Frix v. State °5 establish clear
guidelines for prosecuting criminal defendants under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-12100.1,106 16-12-100.3, 'o7 and 16-12-103. ' °' According to these guidelines, a defendant who sends a sexually explicit text message to a minor
using a cell phone may be charged with distributing harmful material
to a minor in violation of section 16-12-103. However, because such
conduct does not fall within the statutory meaning of sections 16-12100.1 or 16-12-103, charges under these statutes would be inappropriate.
Applying this interpretation, a person sending a message to a minor
from a cell phone violates only one of Georgia's obscenity statutes,
whereas a person sending an identical message to a minor from a
computer violates an additional statute simply due to the medium
through which the message is sent. Although based on a seemingly
accurate construction of the language of the statutes at issue, the result
seems strange in a modern era of daily technological advances, which
renders messages sent from cell phones and computers nearly indistinguishable. As aptly noted in the appellee's brief in Frix, "the average
person would know that cellular phone text messages are no different
than instant messages on a computer."10' 9 In many ways, cell phones
have become analogous to small computers. 0 Cell phones can store
information, send e-mails, and access Internet websites. In addition,
numeric cell phone keypads are becoming increasingly obsolete and are
being replaced by touch screens and alphabetic keyboards with the
layout of traditional typewriters, known as QWERTY keyboards,'
features that make cell phones even more similar to computers. Given
these capabilities, the court's differential treatment of cell phones under
Georgia's obscenity laws seems tenuous and suggests further evolution
to come in this area of law. Frix, therefore, may prove to be merely an
interim case that calls to the attention of the Georgia General Assembly

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
7, 2009,

298 Ga. App. 538, 680 S.E.2d 582 (2009).
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1 (2007).
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.3 (2007).
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103 (2007).
Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 4.
See id.
Peter Svensson, The Rise of the Cellphone QWERTY, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr.
availableat httpJ/hamptonroads.com/2009/04/rise-cellphone-qwerty.
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the need for further expansion so that cell phones, with their everincreasing capabilities, are on par with their computer equivalents when
determining violations of Georgia's obscenity laws.
To better understand the ramifications of the court's decision, consider
the following two scenarios. In Scenario 1, a man sends a sexually
explicit e-mail message to a minor using his computer. This conduct
would be subject to criminal charges under both O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1
and § 16-12-103. In Scenario 2, a man sends a sexually explicit text
message to a minor using his cell phone. Even if the messages sent in
Scenarios 1 and 2 are identical in terms of content, the man in Scenario
2 would only be in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103. Further, if the two
cases were before a judge who prefers consecutive sentencing, the man
in Scenario 2 would receive a more lenient sentence for essentially the
same conduct as the man in Scenario 1.12 Also, subject to whether
O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12"3 is deemed to require registration as a sex
offender for violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103, the man in Scenario 1
would be required to register with the sex offender database while the
man in Scenario 2 might not. This result is difficult to rationalize given
the similarities between modern text and e-mail messages. The content
of an e-mail message can be sent via text message in identical form, so
that the material viewed by the recipient is the same through either
medium. Therefore, if the primary purpose behind the obscenity
statutes is to protect the recipient from the harmful effects of viewing
the obscene material, should it really matter which medium is used to
send the material if the content viewed is identical and equally harmful?
To justify the inconsistent treatment of cell phones, the court in Frix
discussed the difference between transmittal via floppy disks and CDROMs and transmittal via text messages." 4 According to the court,
transmittal by floppy disk or CD-ROM requires making the device
available so that the recipient may access its content from a computer,
while transmittal by text message does not require "furnishing the phone
itself to another person or allowing another person to have access to the
phone."" 5 The implications of this distinction, however, again lead to
inequitable results when applied to an actual fact pattern. For example,

112. From a consecutive sentencing standpoint, the man in Scenario 1 would be
convicted of two misdemeanors of high and aggravated nature and could be fined up to
$10,000 or incarcerated up to twenty-four months (the combined total for the two
misdemeanors). In contrast, the man in Scenario 2 would only be convicted of one
misdemeanor of high and aggravated nature and could only be fined up to $5000 or
incarcerated up to twelve months.
113. O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 (Supp. 2009).
114. Frix, 298 Ga. App. at 541-42, 680 S.E.2d at 586.
115. Id. at 542, 680 S.E.2d at 586.
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if a person sends a message to a minor through a text message, as
opposed to loading the same message onto a floppy disk and physically
producing the device to the minor, that person has chosen a method of
transmission that is not only less cumbersome but also avoids a possible
additional conviction for furnishing obscene material to a minor under
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1. In effect, the court is declaring that a simpler
mode of transmission of identical content will receive a less severe
punishment by satisfying only one obscenity statute as opposed to two.
The purpose of O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1 further suggests that the
statute may be expanded in the future to include cell phones. The
primary purpose behind the enactment of the statute was to penalize
individuals who transmit obscene material to minors by electronic
means. 16 If the same material can be transmitted electronically in
identical form through a cell phone or a computer, the distinction
between which type of electronic device is used to transmit the material
seems irrelevant and without rational justification.
Finally, the distinction may result from a generational gap between
the older generation on the appellate court panel and the younger
generation, which has grown up in an era in which cell phones are
viewed as a necessity of life, capable of meeting all daily communication
needs. Older generations grew up using e-mail as the primary mode of
electronic communication. In contrast, today's youth are growing up in
a world in which the interaction between cell phones and websites such
as Twitter and Facebook continues to gain popularity as a means to
communicate, while e-mail accounts are rarely used." 7 Moreover,
most modern cell phones can send messages in a variety of forms-texts,
instant messages, e-mails, and even Facebook posts."' The distinction
Georgia's obscenity statutes create may become obsolete as the gap
between the generations' familiarity with modern cell phones narrows
and knowledge of evolving cell phone capabilities increases among all
generations.
In conclusion, although Frix establishes clear precedent for the
application of Georgia's obscenity statutes to text messages, the
implications from the application of this precedent suggest the possibility
of more changes to come. Specifically, the capabilities of modern cell
phones and their similarities to e-mail messages suggest a strong
likelihood that text messages will eventually be equated with e-mail

116. Baker, supra note 23, at 105.
117. Chad Lorenz, The Death of E-Mail: Teenagers areAbandoning their Yahoo! And
Hotmail Accounts. Do the Rest of Us Have To?, SLATE MAG., Nov. 14, 2007, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2177969/pagenum/aIVI.
118. Id.
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messages in terms of applying these statutes so that messages sent to
minors through either medium will receive the same punishment under
Georgia law.
HAYLEY S. STRONG
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